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The Obsolescing Bargain Model and Oil: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) 1933-1951 
 
Abstract 
We employ archival evidence to investigate events culminating in the nationalisation 
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, which followed disagreements over 
profit allocations arising from a previously negotiated concession. The case study 
expands the traditional obsolescing bargain model (OBM) by accommodating the use 
and impact of accounting information in negotiation contexts. The analysis reveals that 
managerial control and the deployment of accounting information by the AIOC 
temporarily strengthened its bargaining power vis a vis the Iranian government leading 
up to the nationalisation crisis, demonstrating the potential importance of these new 
dimensions in wider contexts.  
 
 
Keywords: Obsolescing bargain modelling, Iranian oil industry, Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, accounting 
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Introduction 
 
In May 1951, following protracted negotiations and a resulting crisis, the Iranian 
government nationalised the local assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). 
Many studies of similar expropriations have used the obsolescing bargaining model 
(OBM) to explain power shifts between the multi-national enterprise (MNE) and host 
country (HC) government.1  In the model, the bargaining power of the MNE, however 
favourable the terms of entry, is undermined, or rendered obsolete, once sunk 
investments are made in the HC. Since the wave of oil and natural resource 
expropriations of the mid twentieth century, MNEs have recently gained more 
bargaining power through the greater willingness of HC governments to co-operate, for 
example via international institutions and trade organisations, which has led to the 
development of new models. These can be described as political bargaining models 
(PBM), of which the OBM is a specific case.2  In PBM models, emphasis is placed on 
the ability of the MNE to use political process and resource control to obviate the 
tendency to obsolescence.  
In this article, we suggest two further extensions of the PBM/OBM approach. 
These are first, the roles of managerial control and accounting information. In MNE/HC 
bargaining situations, relative power is a function of staff deployments, particularly in 
roles demanding specialist knowledge. Whether overseas technical specialists 
appointed and trained by the MNE are used, or alternatively, locally recruited experts, 
can potentially govern the balance of power between the MNE and HC. Likewise, how 
accounting information is produced and disclosed, most usually at the behest of the 
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senior management of the MNE, can strongly influence the bargaining position. The 
second extension is to place the model in a dynamic and iterative context, such that 
entry conditions and early phase outcomes influence subsequent outcomes, and there 
DUHGLVFRQWLQXLWLHVRUWLSSLQJSRLQWVPHDQLQJWKDWWKH01(¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRVLWLRQFDQ
obsolesce suddenly.  
Using this approach illustrates the value of historical analysis in relation to the 
general international business literature, and provides an important justification for 
analysing the AIOC case. Although the case is well known, and has been examined 
from a number of perspectives,3 it can potentially shed new light on the relationships 
implied by the OBM and its variants as outlined above. Moreover, by examining the 
role of accounting in the dynamic bargaining process, new evidence not hitherto 
examined in the business history or accounting literatures can be employed. In such 
fashion, the role of accounting in diplomatic contexts, or in bargaining situations 
between the MNE and HC, upon which the business history, accounting and wider 
literatures are currently silent, can be better understood.   
These gaps in the literature lead us to our principle research questions, 
summarised as follows. First, how did bargaining gains split between the parties and 
how did they reflect and in turn impact on their bargaining strategies? Second, did the 
AIOC use management control and accounting information to impact dynamically the 
iterative negotiations leading up to the nationalisation crisis? Third, to what extent is 
the extension of the PBM/OBM to include these dimensions warranted in the general 
case? Archival evidence, including new sources, is utilised in order to better answer 
these questions.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section reviews 
the literature on MNE/HC bargaining focusing on the OBM approach, leading to a 
4 
 
conceptual framework extending the OBM to include management control, accounting 
information, and dynamic interactions. The third section discusses the research 
methodology and the framing of the Iranian nationalisation case study. In the fourth 
section, empirical evidence is introduced, examining the motivations of the main 
protagonists and how accounting was used in a series of bargaining situations. The 
conclusion summarises the main arguments. 
 
Bargaining models  
The OBM is frequently referred to as the accepted paradigm of MNE-HC government 
relations in international political economy.4 In detail, the OBM explains the changing 
nature of bargaining relations between an MNE and HC government as a function of 
the goals, resources and constraints of both parties.5 Gains for each party depend on 
relative bargaining power, determined by ability to withhold resources and capabilities, 
such as raw materials, capital, and technological and access to rare country-specific 
advantages, such as valuable mineral resources.6 The outcome should favour the party 
with the strongest resources, highest issue salience, weakest constraints and greatest 
coercive power.7 Relative bargaining power shifts to the HC government over time as 
the MNE transfers assets to the host country in the form of sunk investments, causing 
the original bargain to obsolesce. Some scholars argue that the OBM has outlived its 
usefulness, as HC governments have since become more co-operative towards MNE 
investors.8 Case studies that have tested the model reveal that MNEs often retain 
relative bargaining power and prevent host country governments from behaving 
opportunistically so that bargains, in practice, are seldom obsolesced.9 
Recognising these apparent weaknesses in the original OBM, certain 
modifications have been suggested. These have included the argument that MNE-HC 
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relations are iterative political bargains negotiated between MNEs and HC governments 
over firm and country specific resources, together with a variety of government policies 
at the industry level, influenced by, and linked to, alliances, interests and behaviour 
outside the specific issue at stake. The outcomes can be also influenced by governance 
inseparability, where previously agreed contracts are irreversible.10 Political aspects of 
MNE strategic behaviour, designed to generate firm-specific advantage based on 
improved relationships with governments include resource commitment, personal 
relations, lobbying and political accommodation.11 Where the outcome appears to 
favour the MNE in terms of distribution of gains, for example where the investment 
turns out to be more profitable than the original negotiations envisaged, the HC 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH EHQHILW FRVW UDWLR PD\ IDOO SRWHQWLDOO\ FDXVLQJ WKH
bargain to obsolesce.12 7KH 01(¶V WR XVH DFFRXQWLQJ PHFKDQLVPV WR GLVJXLVH WKH
profitability of its operations is therefore of substantial potential significance. 
Whilst acknowledging the value of general extensions to the OBM in the form 
of the PBM, it is noteworthy that they do not specifically accommodate the roles of 
managerial control of assets and the accounting function. Likewise, the accounting 
literature, when considering colonial contexts has not considered the allocations of 
gains from MNE investments, nor the role of accounting in potentially distorting the 
profitability of such projects, concentrating more broadly on the role of profit and profit 
maximisation as a motive force of subordination in colonial contexts.13 Where 
managerial control and accounting are used in bargaining, the situation naturally 
evolves iteratively, demonstrating the value of the business history approach. Business 
historians have applied dynamic approaches to similar cases of MNE-HC bargaining 
accompanied by the threat of expropriation, for example US MNEs Kaisers in Ghana 
and the United Fruit Company in Latin America.14 The current paper builds on these 
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dynamic approaches by incorporating management control and accounting dimensions 
and integrating them with the key facets of the OBM/PBM. Such an approach allows 
us to integrate the above literature review with our additional perspectives in the form 
of a conceptual framework through which MNE-HC government bargaining dynamics 
can be examined.  
 
<INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The framework is illustrated in Figure 1. Initial entry conditions set the 
framework for the relative bargaining power of the two sides. As in the OBM, the HC 
bargaining position is strengthened as the MNE makes sunk investments. The relative 
positions of both sides are mediated by HC public policies that apply to industry specific 
issues, such as local regulation and access to markets, along with associated 
legitimation strategies by the MNE. For convenience, these factors are labelled as PBM 
bargaining enhancement factors in figure 1. These dimensions are borrowed from the 
OBM and PBM perspectives, as outlined above. Further dimensions, specified in figure 
 DUH WKH 01(¶V V\VWHPV RI PDQDJHPHQW FRQWURO DQG WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI DFFRXQWLQJ
information. These dimensions are closely linked. Assets owned by the MNE, and their 
control by its managers, provide an important opportunity for corporate executives to 
use subjective decisions on valuation and information disclosure, whether in diplomatic 
contexts or through its financial reporting function, to bolster their bargaining position. 
Bargaining enhancement factors can reflect conflictual and co-operative motives in the 
bargaining process and the outcomes are reflected in the relative distribution of gains. 
Insofar as these accrue to the HC, the traditional OBM applies, and insofar as they 
accrue to the MNE, the incremental factors arising from the PBM, management control 
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and accounting are dominant and obsolescence is mitigated. The relative gains are 
further mediated by political environments, which for HC include the attitudes of 
stakeholder groups, including employees, political parties and lobbies, and, for the 
MNE, include domestic shareholders and involvement with wider industry networks. 
The environments of both are linked through the operation of international diplomacy 
and participation in international and multi-lateral organisations. Accrual of gains from 
either side then, interacts positive and negatively with these environments, which 
determines the revised bargaining position of the participants in the next round of 
negotiations. A final noteworthy feature of figure 1, connecting the MNE-HC political 
environments, is the indirect emphasis attributed to geo-political and diplomatic 
interactions, which can be substantial and complex, so that whilst the model has its 
primary focus of the dyadic nature of MNE-HC relations, it acknowledges such 
additional influences as the aggregate of other powerful stakeholders. The relationships 
in figure 1 accommodate dynamic iterations, and for the purposes of presentational 
simplicity show the bargaining opportunities and gains to be in symmetry. In reality, 
the balance of bargaining power and distribution of gains can tip in favour of one side 
or the other. As a consequence, new bargaining strategies can emerge, if the gains are 
unbalanced, potentially also leading to rapid obsolesce of the checks and balances 
implied in the model.  
The advantages of the conceptual framework are that it provides an overview of 
the main relationships suggested by the literature, with the addition of the new 
dimensions suggested from the above review. These relationships can now be examined 
further by considering empirical evidence. The next section outlines rationale for 
choosing the AIOC case study, and the specific focus of attention, as a means of further 
elaborating the conceptual framework. 
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Methodology and case study background 
The case study examines the relationship between the AIOC and successive Iranian 
governments in the period 1933-1951. The reason for the selection of these dates is that 
1951 was the year in which the Iranian government nationalised the local assets of the 
AIOC. In broad terms, the expropriation marked the obsolescence of the agreement 
made in 1933, which set the tone of the subsequent negotiations up to the crisis of 1951. 
  As noted above, important novel dimensions are managerial control and the role 
of accounting information. The AIOC case is particularly useful in this respect, because 
from the outset, deployment of technical staff and profit and profit sharing were at the 
centre MNE-HC negotiations and concessions. These issues were established from the 
outset, when the RULJLQDOFRQFHVVLRQQHJRWLDWHGE\:LOOLDP.QR['¶$UF\OHGWRWKH
discovery of significant new oil field and the construction of a refinery at Abadan. The 
Anglo Persian Oil Company (the predecessor of the AIOC) was then established with 
the exclusive right to explore, develop, exploit, and transport petroleum in return for 
providing the Iranian government with 16 per cent of the net profit on all operations.15  
Subsequent negotiations led to the revision of this allocation, so that in 1933, a new 
agreement set the royalty paid to Iran at a fixed sum of 4s per ton, plus 20 per cent of 
the dividend payable to ordinary shareholders, and a minimum annual payment of 
£750,000, whilst local assets would be shifted Iranian management through the 
employment of local VWDIILQWHFKQLFDOUROHVUHIHUUHGWRDV³,UDQLDQLVDWLRQ´16 As with 
accounting profit, Iranianisation provided AIOC executives with significant scope for 
voluntary action, reporting and interpretation17. 
The problematic nature of profit determination and distribution between the 
MNE and HC has been noted in the literature. For example, Mansoor argues that, by 
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WKH$,2&¶VRZQDGPLVVLRQDFFXUDWHO\FDOFXODWLQJSURILWVZDVFRPSOH[18 while Elm 
believes the British government manipulated dividends and taxes so tKDWµ,UDQZDVOHIW
DWWKHPHUF\RIWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWZKLFKE\LQFUHDVLQJ$,2&¶VWD[HVGHFUHDVHG
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VQHWSURILWVDQGWKXVGHFUHDVHG,UDQ¶VSHUFHQWVKDUHLQGLYLGHQGVDQG
JHQHUDOUHVHUYHV¶19 Keddie agrees, noting that the AIOC paid much more in income tax 
to the British government than it did in royalties to the Iranian government.20 Similar 
conflicts over profit and profit sharing arose with the second most important British 
business institution in Iran, the Imperial Bank, which was accused of disguising its 
SURILWVE\PDNLQJWUDQVIHUVWRRUIURPµLQQHU¶RUµVHFUHW¶UHVHUYHVEHIRUHUHDFKLQJWKH
SXEOLVKHGILJXUH7KH,PSHULDO%DQN
VµUHDO¶SURILWVZHUHRQDYHUDJHDERXWWZLFHDV
high as its published profits between 1890 and 1952.21  
Although these prior studies acknowledge that accounting was at the centre of 
negotiations in a number of contexts in Iran over a long period, there has been no 
systematic analysis of profit distribution or how profits were reported by the AIOC. To 
fill this gap therefore, using the BP Archive at Coventry, the paper first introduces new 
evidence drawn from the annual reports of the AIOC in the period 1933 to 1950.22 
Second, the paper uses further archival evidence in the form of memoranda and 
correspondence that sheds further light on how these accounting numbers were 
interpreted. The same evidence also facilitates our analysis of the exercise of 
management control, of which the use of accounting was an important component. Of 
particular significance in all these respects is the Gidel memorandum. In 1948, to assist 
its renegotiation of the 1933 concession, the Iranian government appointed Gilbert 
Gidel, a French Law Professor from the University of Paris. The crucial role of the 
memorandum was acknowledged in the literature23, but its contents have not thus far 
been empirically analysed in detail*LGHO¶VIRFXVZDVRQWKHDFFRXQWLQJ, governance 
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and legal aspects of the agreement, and the contents of his memorandum are therefore 
of particular importance for our investigation below.24 
 
AIOC/British and Iranian government bargaining, 1933-1951 
 
This new evidence is now used to develop a case study focused on the use of accounting 
in the bargaining process between the AIOC and Iranian government over oil 
concessions and their renegotiation in the period from 1933 to the nationalisation crisis 
of the first half of 1951. The evidence is used to address each of the research questions 
in turn. The first section below therefore discusses evidence on how the gains were 
distributed in the bargaining process. Having contextualised the process, the role of 
accounting information in negotiations with specific reference to the main points of 
contention, which centred on profit, profit distribution, taxation is explained in the next 
section. The conclusion section following the case analysis includes a discussion of the 
generalisability of the model in figure 1 with reference to the empirical findings. 
 
Profits and profit sharing, 1933-1951. 
As noted earlier, an important ingredient of the OBM approach is the distribution of 
gains between the MNE and HC government. Such splits can depend on the initial entry 
conditions but also the evolution of relative bargaining strength of the parties. To 
examine the empirical trend so that the evolution of the bargaining process can be 
contextualised, the split of profits between the main claimants: the Iranian government, 
the British government and residual AIOC non-Iranian shareholders, is analysed in 
table 1.  
 
<INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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The figures in table 1 are calculated from the AIOC Annual Report and Accounts (1933-
1950). The distribution of profits between major claimants is VKRZQLQ¶VDQGDV
percentages of the total for each year.  The distribution of profits reflects the terms of 
the 1933 agreement and the (51%) stake in the equity of the AIOC taken by the British 
government. Residual, non-Iranian AIOC shareholders thus had a 49% stake in the 
equity and also controlled the preference shares25. $OO SDUWLHV¶ VKDUHV WKHUHIRUH
depended on production levels, but the distribution of gains between them also 
depended on oil prices, as the Iranian government received a fixed royalty per ton, and 
on the dividend policy of the AIOC executives; in other words, their decisions about 
whether to pay a high proportion of profits to shareholders as dividends, or to retain 
those profits as reserves. 
As the trends in table 1 show, the distribution of gains varied considerably 
through time. In the years immediately following the new concession in 1933, the 
Iranian government typically received less than 30% of profits. The high demand for 
oil during the post-war reconstruction of Europe enabled the company to achieve a rapid 
expansion in the volume of its sales and profits. These rose from £7.3 million in 1941 
to £48.5 million in 1949 before more than doubling to approximately £83.6 million in 
1950. Although the profits of the AIOC demonstrated a generally rising trend up to 
1950, the gains were distributed unevenly. Indeed, in percentage terms, the Iranian 
government share rose during years of lower profit, as it received a relatively fixed 
proportion of a variable overall profit. The fixed price royalty and reliance on dividend 
distributions limited the percentage share falling to the Iranians to historically low 
levels after 1945. A further factor at work here was the much higher share accruing 
directly to the British government at the expense of both the Iranian government and 
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residual AIOC shareholders. The new distribution can be explained by increases in 
taxes on profits levied by the British government during the post 1945 period.  
 
 
<INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 
At first sight, the post 1945 distribution of gains in figure 1 is the opposite of the 
predictions of the OBM. In the pure OBM model, the gains to the MNE should decline 
at the expense of the HC as sunk investments increase. To assess the extent to which 
tKLVZDVDFWXDOO\WKHFDVHWDEOHDQDO\VHVWKH$,2&¶VFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHLQWKHSRVW
war period. As table 2 shows, the AIOC invested a substantial proportion of its funds, 
the majority of which came from profitable operations, in new fixed capital projects. 
However, as table 2 also shows, the majority of these funds were invested outside Iran, 
and the proportion tended to increase further after 1946. In OBM terms, although the 
AIOC had substantial fixed investments in Iran, they did not increase substantially 
UHODWLYHWRLQYHVWPHQWVHOVHZKHUHVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVWUDWHJ\ZDVWRUHGXFH
LWVGHSHQGHQFHRQ,UDQ,QRIWKH$,2&¶VDFWLYLW\ZDVLQ,UDQUHIOHFWLQJ
typical pre-war levels, but by 1950 this had fallen to 80.15%, with rapid increases in 
activity in Kuwait, Iraq and the UK.26 Furthermore, an apparent reluctance to carry 
through commitments on Iranianisation left British technical staff with substantial 
influence over the deployment and operation of assets in Iran. In summary, the pattern 
RIIL[HGFDSLWDOLQYHVWPHQWZDVXQOLNHO\WRHURGHWKH$,2&¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU 
 Taken together, the data in tables 1 and 2 suggest a potential strengthening of 
the AIOC bargaining position. The revealed trends in the data provide important 
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contextual background for analysing the negotiations between the AIOC and successive 
Iranian governments in the lead up to the nationalisation crisis. Unsurprisingly, the main 
variables in the tables, relating to capital expenditure royalties, dividend payments, and 
taxation were the subject of contentious negotiations. These are analysed further in the 
next section. 
 
The concession bargaining process 
An important reason for the 1933 renegotiation was that the Iranian government 
mistrusted the process of profit calculation that in turn determined its 16% share. The 
fixed royalty per ton and share in the dividend agreed in the 1933 concession were 
designed to overcome these objections, basing the Iranian share on parameters that were 
less subject to accounting manipulation.27 For the analysis that follows and with 
reference to figure 1, the 1933 concession forms the entry conditions for the next phase 
of the model. As the trends in the previous section suggest, the relatively fixed nature 
of the entry conditions meant the Iranian government did not participate equally once 
it was clear that profits would be larger than originally expected. In the eyes of the 
Iranian government, the bargain was obsolete and pressures to renegotiate mounted 
once again. In October 1947, the Iranian government passed a bill to initiate a 
renegotiation of the concession, seeking an increase in royalties and faster progress on 
Iranianisation.  
The new measure reflected PBM elements that potentially strengthened the 
Iranian government. Secular nationalist sentiments gained ground after 1945, leading 
to a strong political backlash against British involvement in Iranian, mostly directed 
against the two leading businesses the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company and the Imperial 
Bank.28 The leading nationalist politician, Dr. Mohammed Musaddiq, used his 
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increasing power base in the Iranian parliament to promote laws that potentially 
weakened the AIOC. The law of 2 December 1944, for example, prevented the Iranian 
government from granting concessions to foreigners without the full agreement of 
parliament.29 The 1947 Bill also gave the Iranian government the right to take all 
necessary measures to secure Iran's rights to her national resources where such rights 
had been violated.30 As Prime Minister in 1951, Musaddiq promulgated the law 
QDWLRQDOLVLQJWKH$,2&¶VDVVHWVLQ,UDQ 0XVDGGLT¶VLQFUHDVLQJSROLWLFDOSRZHUEDVHhad 
been bolstered, at the expense of political groupings and institutions more inclined to 
compromise, by the distribution of relative gains in favour of the AIOC. These two 
factors, which might have led to rapid obsolescence of the 1933 concession, explain the 
$,2&¶VUDSLGGLYHUVLILFDWLRQWKURXJKLWVFDSLWDO LQYHVWPHQWSURJUDPPHLQWKHSHULRG
1946-1950.  
In the face of rising nationalism, WKH $,2&¶V EDUJDLQLQJ SRVLWLRQ ZDV
strengthened through its powerful political connections. These arose from its strategic 
LPSRUWDQFH WR %ULWDLQ¶V QDWLRQDO HFRQRP\ DQG RYHUVHDV LQWHUHVWV31 (IIHFWLYHO\ µWKH
company was mainly owned by the British government, its power was in the end that 
RI%ULWDLQ¶32 Describing the AIOC in 1959, Winston Churchill praised the historical 
UROHRIµWKLVJUHDWHQWHUSULVH¶DQGLWVFRQWULEXWLRQWRµQDWLRQDOSURVSHULW\LQSHDFHDQG
RXUVDIHW\LQZDU¶33 In Iran, the AIOC was so domLQDQWµWKDWLWZDVHIIHFWLYHO\DVWDWH
within a state and regarded to all intents and purposes as an arm of the British Admiralty 
DQGWKH%ULWLVKVWUDWHJLFSROLF\¶34. In geo-political terms, the British government used 
the AIOC as an instrument of foreign policy to fight communism and advance the 
Anglo-American special relationship. 35 $WWKHVDPHWLPH,UDQLDQRLOVXSSOLHVZHUHµD
PDMRUVRXUFHRIVRIWFXUUHQF\JHQHUDWLRQDQGWD[UHYHQXHIRUWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶36 
The Abadan oil refinery was the largest in WKHZRUOGDQGµDVRXUFHRIQDWLRQDOSULGH¶37 
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From a bargaining point of view, the AIOC was enormously strengthened by its control 
of the oil tanker fleet, which could effectively deny any export revenues to Iran.38 In 
view of these resource and policy based advantages, the British government had a 
strong incentive to ensure that the key elements of the Iranian concessions remained in 
place.  
Nonetheless, they recognised that nationalisation was a real threat. Most 
officials in the Foreign Office were of the opinion that it would be impossible to work 
the oilfields without the support of the Iranians, especially if relationships became 
hostile.39 As Herbert Morrison, Leader of the House of Commons and Foreign 
Secretary, reflected at the height of the nationalisation crisis, if the Iranian oil supplies 
FHDVHGWRIORZIURP,UDQµWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVXSRQWKHHFRQRP\WKHOLIHDQGWKHSROLWLFDO
and strategic future of wide areas throughout the world would be disastrous since about 
a quarter of oil products that AIOC GUDZFRPHVIURP$EDGDQ¶40 For these reasons, the 
$,2&IDFHGSUHVVXUHWRDGGUHVVWKH,UDQLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQFHUQVUDWKHUWKDQDOORZ
them to escalate into more serious grievances.41 
These political incentives and connections formally strengthened the bargaining 
position of the AIOC on the one hand, but on the other, impacted on the bargaining 
response of the Iranian nationalists. They believed with some justification that the 
AIOC was acting on instructions from British government to effectively deprive the 
Iranian government of its reasonable share of revenues.42 As a consequence, both sides 
enlisted other PBM elements in this phase of the negotiations, which were manifested 
in the form of disputes about corporate governance within the framework of local and 
international law. Notwithstanding the appointment of Gidel on the Iranian side, a 
leading international lawyer, most of the advantages in these respects accrued to the 
AIOC through its strong connections with the British political establishment.  
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 7KH,UDQLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VODFNRIWUXVWLQWKHSROLFLHVDQGSURFHVVHVIROORZHGE\
WKH$,2&ZDVWKHSUHFXUVRUIRUWKHLVVXDQFHRIWKH*LGHO0HPRUDQGXPKHUHDIWHUµWKH
0HPRUDQGXP¶*LGHOVXPmarised the Iranian concerns, to which the AIOC provided a 
point-by-point response.43 The Iranian government was firmly of the belief that their 
QHJOLJLEOHVKDUHRIWKHRLOSURILWVZDVWKHUHVXOWRI$,2&¶VXQQHFHVVDU\H[SHQGLWXUHRQ
activities and goods that were designed to satisfy certain influential people as opposed 
to genuinely being used for public welfare.44 The Iranian case in the Memorandum was 
thus based on a claim that profits earned in Iran were being invested elsewhere by the 
AIOC, and that Iran would thus be deprived of its share of profits from these operations. 
In addition, the Memorandum noted that the company had denied Iranian requests to 
inspect its books for the purposes of ascertaining the accuracy of royalty and other 
payments. The Memorandum also pointed out that the AIOC had not improved the 
working conditions of the Iranian workforce and that foreign personnel had not been 
reduced in line with agreements.45  
 Meanwhile, in response to the Iranian instigated negotiations, the AIOC now 
enlisted new elements, including the use of managerial control and financial reporting 
to bolster its position. Neville Gass, Managing Director of AIOC and the AIOC 
QHJRWLDWRU LQ  QRWHG WKDW KLV ,UDQLDQ FRXQWHUSDUWV µSRVVHVVHG RQO\ D YHU\
elementary ideDRIDFFRXQWV¶46 *DVV¶VVXFFHVVRU AIOC Chairman Sir William Fraser47, 
and his management team, therefore believed themselves to be in a good position to use 
their control of assets and cash flows and associated accounting arguments as a tool to 
GHIHQGKLVSRVLWLRQDJDLQVWWKH,UDQLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPV7KHVHFODLPVDUHQRw set 
RXWLQGHWDLOE\RUGHURIVXEVWDQWLYHSRLQWUHIHUULQJWRWKH0HPRUDQGXP¶VEDUJDLQLQJ
GHPDQGLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHDQGWKHQWRWKH$,2&¶VUHVSRQVH 
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Concerning the definition of profit and the Iranian share of these profits, the 
Memorandum called foUWKHPHWKRGRIFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDULRXVUHVHUYHV
to be clarified in an accurate manner.48 *LGHODOVRFODLPHGWKDWWKH$,2&¶VGHSUHFLDWLRQ
calculations unfairly reduced profits and, therefore, the amount of money paid to the 
Iranian government.49 It pointed out that the Iranian government would, in effect, have 
paid toward the depreciation of properties outside Iran to which it had no legal 
ownership at the end of the concession. In addition, it suggested that the government 
would also have paid tRZDUGWKHGHSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURSHUWLHVLQ,UDQDQG
that these assets should revert to the government at the end of the concession free of 
DQ\ FRVW +RZHYHU WKH $,2&¶V LQWHQWLRQ ZDV WKDW WKH RUGLQDU\ VWRFNKROGHUV ZRXOG
benefit from the reserves DWWKHHQGRIWKHFRQFHVVLRQDQGIURPWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURSHUW\
outside Iran, while the government would have no reversionary right to the property 
inside Iran.50 
For the Iranians, the lack of control over profit determination and distribution 
was made worse E\ WKH $,2&¶V PHWKRGV RI DSSURSULDWLQJ SURILWV WR UHVHUYHV $OL
Mansur51, a negotiator on the Iranian side, commented that the profits and reserves were 
implausibly large and advised that ownership rights associated with them should be 
clarified so that the interests of Iran were completely safeguarded.52 He stated that the 
µ$,2&KDVDFWHGXQGHULQVWUXFWLRQVIURPWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWDQGUHVHUYHGWHUULILF
amounts in order not to pay more than what the company laid down in the 1933 
agreement. However, it should be stipulated in the supplemental agreement that the 
Iranian government would share in all the reserves up to 20% whether visible or 
LQYLVLEOH¶53  In other words, the Iranians were anxious to specify their share in terms of 
all profits, whether distributed as dividends or not and regardless of how undistributed 
SURILWVZHUHVSHFLILHGLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VUHVHUYHV 
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The AIOC negotiators took a different view. They argued that the only amount 
DYDLODEOHWRWKH,UDQLDQJRYHUQPHQWZDVRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vgeneral reserve at the 
date of expiration of the concession or of its surrender.54 To justify the deduction of 
depreciation on all assets, including those outside Iran, in arriving at the profits in which 
the Iranian government was entitled to participate, the AIOC noted that overseas assets 
amounted to less than 1% of the total gross value.55 Other reserves, such as those for 
taxation, contingencies and deferred repairs, bad debts, stores stock etc. could not be 
FDOFXODWHGµZLWKDEVROXWHDFFXUDF\¶DQGZHUHQot likely to be payable to shareholders 
unless they were found to have been overstated.56 The AIOC position, and the share of 
profit immediately available to the Iranians, therefore depended significantly on the 
validity of estimates made by its managers about contingent expenses. Application of 
the accounting prudence principle, under which liabilities must be accrued when 
foreseen, provided a strong financial reporting based defence of the AIOC position. The 
foreseeability of the expenses in question was entirely a matter of the subjective 
judgement of AIOC managers, who were free if they chose, to make generous estimates 
of likely costs, thereby forcing the Iranian government to defer its share of profits. 
 The bargaining strategy might have succeeded had the Iranian side been 
sufficiently induced to trust the accounting judgements of AIOC managers. However, 
such trust was in increasingly short supply. The demand in the Memorandum that the 
AIOC should open its books for government inspection57 hinted at IranLDQRIILFLDOV¶
perception of the questionable nature of the accounting policies and their associated lack 
of trust in the judgement of AIOC managers. In short, the AIOC refused the demand for 
inspection citing the apparent objectivity of the basis of payments to the Iranian 
government and commercial expediency. Considering the AIOC case for refusal in more 
detail however, it is apparent that these arguments were merely a smokescreen. The 
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Memorandum based the requirement for inspection on the subjectivity of managerial 
accounting decisions, to which the AIOC responded that the amount distributed as profit 
by way of dividend was an objective and indisputable measure.58 Notwithstanding the 
literal truth of this statement, the actual amount of the dividend was of course a 
subjective matter entirely under the control of AIOC management. Moreover, the more 
those managers chose to limit the proportion of profit paid as a dividend, the greater the 
amount credited to reserves, and greater the scope for them to manipulate of those 
reserves using accounting estimates.  As far as inspecting the books was concerned, 
therefore, simply asserting that the requirement was obviated by the apparent objectivity 
of the Iranian share was irrelevant. In putting up this smokescreen, the AIOC was 
refusing to countenance the bargaining point raised on the Iranian side about reversion 
of assets at the end of the concession. 
 As the evidence in table 1 suggests, the share of profit attributable to the British 
government rose rapidly after 1945 as a function of changes to taxation rates. The 
Iranian government percentage share was reduced in equal proportion. The 
0HPRUDQGXP¶VVXEVWDQWLYHFODLPVZHUHWKDW%ULWLVKWD[VKRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQGHGXFWHG
IURPWKH,UDQLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURILWVKDUHDQd that the AIOC underpaid Iranian tax on 
its profits because of the immunities it enjoyed. The Memorandum also requested the 
restoration of its share of profits lost historically due to these arrangements. To support 
the case, Gidel constructed a table comparing taxes paid to both the British and the 
Iranian government from 1933 to 1947 inclusive, reproduced here as table 3.  
 
                              <INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE> 
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As the data in table 3 show, both governments experienced increases in taxation receipts 
during the period of the 1933 concession. Amounts paid to the two governments were 
approximately equal at the outset, but between 1933 and 1947 the Iranian share 
LQFUHDVHGE\DIDFWRURIZKLOVWWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VVKDUHLQFUHDVed by a factor 
of 50.01. The increase of the British government share was most pronounced after 1943 
when income tax was supplemented by excess profit tax.59 Gidel argued that without 
immunities from local customs duties and taxes, the amount received by the Iranian 
government would have around £17million in 1947,60 and commensurate therefore with 
the increases that had gone to the British government.   
A further aspect of British fiscal policy that was particularly relevant to the 
concessionary discussions was the limitation of company dividends. In 1945 the British 
government called first for voluntary restraints on dividends and subsequently 
introduced differential profit taxes with higher rates on dividends and lower rates on 
retentions.61 These policies reflected domestic political pressures in a period of wage 
restraint, and also supply side policies aimed at encouraging investment in the British 
economy. However, due to the nature of the 1933 concession, these policies also limited 
the profit Iranian share. The AIOC therefore came under Iranian pressure to increase 
the dividend, but the company received direct instructions from the British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer not to do so. As a consequence, although profits rose rapidly, for the 
three years after 1947, the AIOC dividend payment remained unchanged.62 
The discrepancy between the sums paid to the British government and Iranian 
governments unsurprisingly led to Iranian pressures for re-negotiation from a number 
of quarters, within and outside the government.63 Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of 
Bank Melli, argued for a fairer distribution in favour of Iran.64 Mansur argued that the 
AIOC enjoyed a range of privileges from their operation in Iran such as cheap labour, 
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exemption from customs duties and charges, exemption from income tax, and freedom 
to import and export as it liked. He added that the negligible share of revenue received 
in return was shocking to Iranian public opinion.65 The Iranian government claimed that 
the payment structure reflected that thH $,2& ZDV VLPSO\ µWKH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQW
XQGHUDQRWKHUIRUP¶66. It was certainly the case, as the data in tables 1 and 3 suggest, 
that the British government through the collection of such taxes heavily skewed the 
gains from the concession away from Iran reflecting the AIOC/British government joint 
control of assets and financial claims upon them.  
Nonetheless, it suited the AIOC to claim a separation of its own interests from 
the British government for negotiating purposes. The company argued that British tax 
provisions were beyond its control, and British taxes were a matter for the British 
government. Furthermore, the AIOC argued that the Iranian government enjoyed 
benefits from investments that would have been impossible if the company had not been 
given tax immunity. The AIOC also claimed that the taxes represented revenues that 
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQXQDYDLODEOHZLWKRXWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLQYHVWPHQWVDVRLOUHVHUYHVZRXOG
otherwise have not been discovered and developed.67 7KHFRPSDQ\¶VQHJRWLDWLQJVWDQFH
in its response to these specific points also reflected the more general expectation of 
AIOC executives that Iranians should be grateful for its investments.68  
In terms of the OBM, it is noteworthy that as AIOC sunk investments increased, 
the Iranian gains from the bargain reduced, substantially as a function of tax 
arrangements. Co-operative actions by the HC government, along the lines of the PBM 
modification likewise strengthened the bargaining position of the AIOC. As the 
discussion above makes clear, managerial control of assets and how they were 
accounted for, strongly underpinned the bargaining power of the AIOC. As a 
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consequence, the accounting and governance based arguments assembled in the 
Memorandum cut little ice with the AIOC negotiators. 
However, the dynamic nature of the bargaining process meant that as the AIOC 
strengthened its position using accounting arguments, the Iranian side was now strongly 
pressured by the absence of a way forward on the basis of international law. The 
outcome of the negotiations did nothing to assuage public opinion. The unfairness of the 
distribution of gains, and lack of recourse through international legal institutions, had 
been made more transparent by the negotiation process, notwithstanding the attempted 
obfuscations of the AIOC. As the evidence in tables 1, 2 and 3 shows, without the need 
to raise significant new capital, the profits of the AIOC were large and use increasingly 
to divert funds to new investment opportunities outside Iran.   
In relation to the OBM conceptual framework described at the outset of this 
paper, the evidence illustrates the role of accounting in mitigating bargain obsolescence. 
Managerial control over assets and accounting policies strongly bolstered the 
bargaining position of the AIOC. These mechanisms were closely integrated with the 
fiscal and national and international institutions, all of which underpinned the 
accounting arguments and further strengthened the AIOC position.         The consequent 
distribution of gains, already strongly favouring the AIOC was maintained and added 
to through further iterations of the bargaining process. 
The corresponding lack of recourse to conventional bargaining channels on the 
Iranian side was compounded by the radical transformation of Iranian politics. The 
ODUJH JDLQV DSSURSULDWHG DQG YHU\ VWUHQJWK RI WKH $,2&¶V QHJRWLDWLQJ SRVLWLRQ LQ
defending these gains now provoked the nationalisation of its Iranian assets. On the 1st 
of May 1951, the Iranian nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammed Musaddiq, introduced 
tKH QDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ ELOO µ)RU WKH KDSSLQHVV DQG SURVSHULW\ RI WKH ,UDQLDQ QDWLRQ¶69 
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Consequently, British technicians abandoned Iran, and Britain declared a worldwide 
embargo on Iranian oil, dramatically reducing oil production. Iranian assets were frozen 
in British currency, and exports prohibited. As the crisis unfolded, British business in 
Iran diminished to a single firm of contractors.70 
  
Conclusion 
Using important archival sources and financial analysis of annual reports, the AIOC-
Iran case has provided empirical evidence in support of a reformulation of OBM/PBM 
type models. The modified model integrates key contributions from existing scholarship 
on MNE-HC bargaining while also demonstrating that these generic bargaining power 
models can be extended through the inclusion of accounting as a variable, which the 
management of the MNE controls in parallel with sunk asset investments. Accounting 
can mitigate the obsolescence normally associated with the build up of such investments 
over the period of a concession.  
 In the AIOC-Iran case, management controlled accounting policies relating to 
depreciation, treatment of reserves, profit distribution and retention and the effects of 
taxation were used effectively as bargaining counters. Iranian claims concerning the 
inequitable consequences of these policies were no doubt justified, as the distribution of 
gains revealed, and AIOC responses mere smokescreens. However, the proprietorial 
nature of accounting information, underpinned by international law and institutions, 
rendered it non-contestable from the Iranian point of view.  
 Such non-contestability effectively closed down conventional diplomatic 
channels for the renegotiation of the 1933 concession, sparking its rapid obsolescence 
via a political revolt against the AIOC in 1951. The case thereby illustrates the value of 
analysing the iterative and dynamic nature of these OBM/PBM models using a historical 
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approach. In the AIOC-Iran case, obsolescence was sudden and was a function of the 
absence of balance in bargaining channels and skewed distribution of gains away from 
the HC in favour of the MNE.   
This paper makes an important contribution to business history and studies on 
the OBM by highlighting the pivotal role that the accounting methods played in the on-
going negotiations between the AIOC and the Iranian government.  Furthermore, this 
research emphasises the role of accounting in bargaining and negotiation situations and 
how it can reinforce unequal power relations in colonial and similar international post-
colonial contexts where a dominant MNE aims to exploit local resources.  
The dynamic role of accounting was clear in the AIOC case, suggesting its 
possible importance in the more general case. Research using OBM/PBM models, 
whether applied in historical or present day contexts, should therefore at least consider 
it as a potentially influential factor. To assess the wider significance, however, further 
research is required. More empirical evidence on how MNEs use their accounts to 
exercise control over local populations, their resources and their governments can 
potentially inform a wide range of historical and current debates on the evolution and 
effectiveness of global institutions of governance.  
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Figure 1: An extended bargaining model 
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Table 1: AIOC profit distribution, 1933-1950 
  
Year Iranian 
Government*  
 
British 
Government** 
 
AIOC 
shareholders**  
 
AIOC 
profits*** 
 ¶V % ¶V % ¶V % ¶V 
 
1933 1,785 22.29 2,781 34.73 3,442 42.98 8,007 
1934 2,159 25.22 2,978 34.79 3,423 39.99 8,560 
1935 2,192 25.79 2,899 34.10 3,409 40.11 8,500 
1936 2,580 30.08 2,967 34.59 3,031 35.33 8,577 
1937 3,545 31.17 4,240 37.28 3,589 31.55 11,374 
1938 3,307 34.55 3,214 33.58 3,050 31.87 9,571 
1939 2,771 40.54 2,457 35.94 1,608 23.53 6,836 
1940 2,786 37.35 3,204 42.95 1,469 19.70 7,459 
1941 2,025 27.61 3,548 48.38 1,760 24.01 7,334 
1942 3,428 25.40 6,886 51.03 3,181 23.57 13,494 
1943 3,618 31.56 4,770 41.60 3,078 26.84 11,465 
1944 4,460 36.01 4,779 38.74 3,128 25.25 12,387 
1945 5,620 40.76 4,954 35.92 3,216 23.32 13,789 
1946 7,130 37.32 6,974 36.51 4,999 26.17 19,103 
1947 7,101 19.08 21,527 57.85 8,581 23.06 37,210 
1948 9,175 16.65 35,013 63.56 10,907 19.80 55,090 
1949 13,489 27.77 26,945 55.47 8,146 16.77 48,580 
1950 16,032 19.18 53,902 64.47 13,671 16.35 83,605 
 
Sources: AIOC annual report, 1933-1950 
Notes: * Iranian government share consists of production royalties plus 20% of the 
ordinary dividend in excess of £671k. ** Residual profits divided 51:49 between British 
Government, and other non AIOC Shareholders. *** AIOC profits are adjusted by 
adding back Iranian production royalties already deducted as a production cost in 
arriving at the disclosed profit per the report and accounts.  
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Table 2: Funds generated and location of capital expenditure: 1946-1951 
 
  A B C D E 
 Funds 
generated 
from 
operations 
Increase in 
long term 
capital* 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(total) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(Iran) 
% 
D/C 
1946 15.2 Nil 20.2 9.0 44.55 
1947 43.9 Nil 31.0 8.0 25.81 
1948 58.8 Nil 39.0 14.0 35.90 
1949 43.1 1.6 55.7 18.0 32.32 
1950 93.5 0.8 42.1 10.0 23.75 
1951 83.2 4.2 60.2 n/a n/a 
Totals 337.7 6.6 188.0 59** 31.38** 
 
Sources:  
Adapted from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, table 10.4, 276 
and figure 14.1, 348. 
Notes: * Refers to long-term loan capital only as there were no equity share issues; ** 
Excludes 1951, the year of the nationalisation crisis. 
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Table 3: Taxes paid by the AIOC to the British and Iranian governments  
 
 
Total tax payable 
 
Year British government         (£) Iranian Government (£) 
1933 305,418 274,412 
1934 511,733 301,135 
1935 408,635 291,169 
1936 910,559 328,524 
1937 1,651,588 362,734 
1938 1,157,029 378,494 
1939 1,955,606 466,204 
1940 2,975,156 460,118 
1941 2,920,682 568,667 
1942 4,917,486 454,168 
1943 7,662,764 606,948 
1944 10,636,457 514,725 
1945 10,681,364 646,644 
1946 10,279,241 768,599 
1947 15,266,665 765,405 
   
Source: BP 101099, Gidel Memorandum, 1946-1949, 6b. 
Note: From 1943, the British government tax receipts included normal income tax 
and also excess profit tax. 
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